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Now, the route protocols defined in the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) are constructed in a common assumption which all
nodes contained in such networks are trustworthy and cooperative. Once malicious or selfish nodes exist, all route paths built by
these protocols must be broken immediately. According to the secure problems within MANET, this paper proposes Cooperative
On-demand Secure Route (COSR), a novel secure source route protocol, against malicious and selfish behaviors. COSR measures
node reputation (NR) and route reputation (RR) by contribution, Capability of Forwarding (CoF) and recommendation upon
Dynamic Source Route (DSR) and uses RR to balance load to avoid hotpoint. Furthermore, COSR defines path collection
algorithm by NR to enhance eﬃciency of protocol. At last, we verify COSR through GloMoSim. Results show that COSR is secure
and stable.
1. Introduction
A mobile Ad Hoc network is a collection of autonomous
nodes that communicate with each other. There are no
base stations, access points, and any centralized control
equipment. The entering and exiting of any node occur
freely and without any management. Further, as the wireless
transmission range of each individual node is limited, the
establishment and maintenance of all route paths in the
MANET depend on all other nodes. In this situation, a
trustworthy environment is important to Ad Hoc network
routing protocol.
Recently, a lot of researches have been done on learning
multihop path in the MANET. This body of literature can be
categorized into two main groups. (1) Table-Driven Routing
Protocols, such as DSDV [1], and OLSR [2]. These protocols
maintain a consistent and up-to-date route table to all
available destinations at each node. (2) On-Demand Routing
Protocols, such as DSR [3], and AODV [4]. These protocols
can react well to frequently node mobility and rapid network
topology changes, and they are not necessary to maintain all
routes periodically.
We focus on on-demand routing protocols, especially
DSR. This group of routing protocol has a common assump-
tion that all nodes in an MANET are not malicious nodes
and all of them are cooperative. Due to this assumption,
misbehavior could destroy route paths established by routing
protocol easily. So far, there are some secure routing
protocols have been proposed, such as Ariadne [5], SEAD
[6], CONFIDANT [7], and CORE [8].
In this paper, we make two contributions to the area
of secure routing protocols for MANET. First, we propose
a reputation-based secure source routing protocol, called
COSR. According to the mobility, self-organization, and
secure problems of MANET, node reputation in COSR is
both regarded as its trustworthiness and CoF which the
node claimed or promised to others. Further, COSR uses
route reputation to choose the best route path. Second, we
present the simulation of several routing attacks and execute
performance evaluation of COSR. Relative to previous
schema in reputation-based routing protocol, COSR is more
secure and more eﬃcient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces main secure problems of current routing protocol
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in the MANET, and Section 3 introduces related work. We
present reputation model and routing protocol of COSR
in Section 4. Section 5 performs simulation and discusses
results. Section 6 provides our conclusion and future work
about COSR.
2. Problems
Current MANET routing protocols face a lot of problems,
such as security and performance. We will describe them in
detail as follows.
(i) DoS: Due to the lack of packet certification in route
discovery and path collection, attacker would inject a
large number of protocol messages with wrong route
information. In general, DoS attack can be performed
as Route Cache Overflow [9] and Sleep Deprivation
Torture [10].
(ii) Blackhole: An attacker attracts route paths to pass it
by promising the shortest route or service and then
drops or forwards data packets to other malicious
nodes for mounting more sophisticated attacks. This
attack includes two types: Active Blackhole and Passive
Blackhole. Active Blackhole attackers that would
inject wrong route information refer to received
RREQ or overheard data packets, so that they might
attract other nodes to choose them as relay station.
On the contrary, Passive Blackhole attackers pose
normal nodes during route discovery, and launch
attack during data transmitting.
(iii) Rushing [11]: This attack targets against on-demand
routing protocols. The attacker relays received RREQ
without any modification as soon as possible, sup-
pressing any later legitimate RREQ.
(iv) Wormhole [12]: Attackers forward RREQ packets by
tunneling between attackers to disrupt communi-
cation. If a wormhole attacker tunnels all packets
through wormhole honestly and reliably, no harm is
done.
(v) Selfish: In the MANET, nodes own limited resource,
especially battery power and bandwidth. Some nodes
refuse to forward or selectively forward the packets
from other nodes to save its resource.
3. Backgrounds and Related Work
As the MANET is dynamic topology and self-organized,
traditional security mechanisms have no eﬀect on routing
attack. Hence, a lot of secure routing protocols have been
proposed to refer to those attacks. According to their main
idea, they can be categorized into four groups.
3.1. Based on Symmetric-Key Encryption. This group uses
symmetric-key encryption to enhance the security of routing
protocol in the MANET. They mostly apply One-Way Hash
function and Hash link algorithm through symmetric key.
This primary group includes Ariadne [5], SEAD [6], and SRP
[13].
3.2. Based on Asymmetric-Key Encryption. This group uses
asymmetric-key encryption to protect routing protocol.
They need a trustworthy independent authority, such as
Certification Authority (CA). The authority is responsible
for creating and publishing certificate for each node. The
certificate contains permanent identity and public key. This
group just includes ARAN [14].
3.3. Based on Hybrid Encryption. This group uses both of
upper encryption technologies. According to the common
idea, the fixed part of route message would be signed by
private key for integrality. Further, private key also is used to
finish node authentication. Furthermore, these protocols use
Hash link to protect distance parameter. The representative
proposals are SAODV [15] and SLSP [16].
3.4. Based on Reputation. The above protocols use cryp-
tography, authentication, and digital signature to protect
security of data contained in the routing messages, and
consequently, they enhance security of routing protocols.
They belong to the area of hard security [17]. However,
the hard security technology can hardly prevent any nodes
from malicious or selfish behavior. Further, it also can
not promote cooperation among nodes. Hence, reputation
is to be implemented in the routing protocol to improve
security of routing protocols. The representatives of them are
CONFIDENT [7], CORE [8], ASU [13], Watchdog [18], and
OCEAN [19].
Table 1 compares the capability of these protocols against
above attacks.
4. COSR Protocol
According to such security problems of the MANET, we pro-
posed COSR protocol, a reputation-based secure dynamic
source routing protocol. COSR assumes that the link between
two nodes is bidirectional, and each node can work in
promiscuous mode.
4.1. Protocol Architecture. COSR protocol follows cross-layer
design [20]. In the COSR, node’s reputation depends on
the information from Physical layer, Media Access Control
(MAC) layer, and Network layer, and it can be computed
by node’s CoF, history action, and recommendation. Hence,
COSR can be divided into monitor, statistics, reputation
model, reputation protocol, and routing protocol. Its archi-
tecture is shown in the Figure 1.
(i) MONITOR: This part includes three modules: neigh-
bor monitor, data relay monitor, and CoF monitor.
Neighbor monitor works with MAC layer. It is used
to monitor neighbors in its radio range and maintain
neighbor list. Data relay monitor is placed in the
network layer. It requires MAC layer working in
promiscuous mode, so that it could check whether
the next hop had transmitted its packets. CoF would
collect information about capability of forwarding
from physical layer and MAC layer, and itincludes
node’s bandwidth, interface state, mobility status,
and power.
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Figure 1: Architecture of COSR protocol.
(ii) STATISTICS: This module is responsible for provid-
ing statistics data about neighbors’ history behavior.
These data include the number of requested and
forwarded protocol messages, and data packets.
(iii) REPUTATION model: This is the core module of
COSR. It is used to evaluate node’s reputation and
integrate route reputation relying on the data from
MONITOR and STATISTICS.
(iv) Reputation Protocol: This part defines reputation
discovery in the MANET. Reputation Protocol clings
with routing protocol and uses routing protocol to
pigback reputation control message and data.
(v) Routing Protocol: It is an extension of DSR by repu-
tation model. It uses NR and RR to choose the best
route path rather than path length. Further, COSR
provides a secure mechanism of path collection in
route discovery.
4.2. Node Reputation. Firstly, because the COSR uses D-S
approach [21] as basic theory to evaluate node’s reputation,
we introduce the key concept of it simply.
Definition 1. Let Θ be a frame of discernment, Θ =
{G,B}, where {G} means good, {B} is contrary, and {G,B}
represents unknown. If a function m : 2Θ → [0, 1], where
(1) m(ø) = 0, and (2) ∑Â⊂Θm(Â) = 1, then m is a basic
probability assignment (bpa) over Θ.
In the COSR, Node Reputation (NR) is defined as a com-
bination of direct reputation, recommendation reputation,




) · α + Rrec
(
i, j
) · β + cof( j) · γ, (1)
where NRij stands for the node reputation value by node Ni
on node Nj · Rdirect(i, j), and Rrec(i, j) are defined under Θ.
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Weights α, β, and γ are the discount factors for diﬀerent
elements of NR, they are defined as follows:
α,β, γ ∈ [0, 1], α + β + γ = 1. (2)
4.2.1. Direct Reputation (Rdirect). Rdirect evaluates the trust-
worthiness of each next hop neighbor. And, it is a metric of
a serial of good, bad and unknown actions. In the COSR,
a node seems good that it forwarded all requested protocol
messages and data packets. On the contrary, it seems bad. If
there are no forwarding requests transmitted to target node,
then it is unknown. Further, COSR uses diﬀerent counters
to do statistics of requested and forwarded protocol message
and data packet, and received forwarding request. Refer to
these counters, packet as metric for control message and byte
for data packet. In this method, COSR can prevent some
selfish nodes from selectively forwarding short data packets
rather than long data packets.
The node reputation contains three parts: m({G}),
m({B}), and m({G,B}). They denote trust, distrust, and
unknown, respectively, and, they are computed by above






m({G}) +m({G,B}) , m({G}) > m({B}),
0, others.
(3)
4.2.2. Recommendation Reputation (Rrec). Rrec represents
others’ subjective evaluation according to target’s behavior,
cooperation, and so forth. Therefore, it is a combination of
a lot of recommendations from neighbors. In the COSR, a
recommendation is defined as follows:
Rec = 〈m({G}),m({B}),m({G,B})〉. (4)
A recommendation is originated from direct reputation and
subjective view about target node. In the COSR, a recom-
mendation is a basic probability assignment ofΘ, and COSR
uses D-S formula to combine all received recommendation.





m({G})−m({B}), m({G}) > m({B}),
0, others..
(5)
4.2.3. Capability of Forwarding (CoF). CoF denotes the
capability of forwarding packets of a certain node. Simply,
we use the remained power, bandwidth, and mobility state
to evaluate it. In the CoF, remained power and bandwidth
are mandatory, however, mobility state is optional. Only
when the node supports Global Positioning System (GPS),
it should provide mobility state and its velocity.
As the information of CoF is provided by its owner,
malicious node might cheat others by false data. To avoid
the emergence of such malicious behavior, COSR takes the
following strategies. (1)Discounting. COSR uses node’s repu-
tation to discount those providing CoF data. (2) Punishment.
Once COSR finds that any node provided a false CoF, it will
punish such node through reducing its reputation level.
4.3. Route Reputation. As the metric of the best route in
traditional routing protocols does not concern security, data
transmitting must fail when a route path contained one or
more malicious nodes. Hence, to avoid such phenomenon,
COSR uses two metrics, hops, and intermediate nodes’
reputation, and then, we define Route Reputation as the
metric of the best route path.
In the COSR, Route Reputation of {Ni → Nk1 → Nk2 →





NRiki × ·· · ×NRkn−1kn , ∀NRklkm ≥ 0,
−1, other,
(6)
where Nk1 , Nk2 ,. . ., Nkm+1 are the intermediate nodes. The RR
is composed of NR of all intermediate nodes in a certain
route path. As NR is a real number between 0 and 1, when
such route contained more intermediate nodes, its RR would
be lower even if it closes 1. Hence, shorter route path gains
higher RR, if there are no malicious nodes. However, if there
are malicious nodes in any short route, the RR of such route
must be lower than a secure longer route. Therefore, RR gives
attention to both of eﬃciency and security of route path.
Further, according to formula (6), NR is independent of
RR. In other words, any node can earn higher reputation
even if it is included by a route with lower reputation. Hence,
COSR does not like [13] that penalizes such nodes around a
malicious node.
4.4. Recommendation Game (RG). As direct observation
about a strange node mostly is limited even not existent,
many solutions (such as CONFIDANT [7], CORE [8], and
COSR) use second-hand evaluation to accelerate collecting
evidence. However, a malicious node may be described
as a perfect node through unfair positive recommenda-
tion, and then they can easily inject wrong route into
network and launch attacks. Consequently, unfair or false
recommendation can break down the constructed reputation
system easily. Therefore, we provide a novel mechanism,
recommendation game, against false recommendation.
4.4.1. Framework
Assumption 1. All nodes in the MANET are rational.
In the recommendation game, there are two kinds of
players (node): reputation requester and provider. No matter
what reputation requester or provider are, they both deal
with reputation request and recommendation rationally.
To formulate the recommendation game, we now give its
definition.
Definition 2. Let RG be a Recommendation Game: RG =
{I ,A,T,P,U}, where I is the set of mobile nodes (reputation
requester and providers); A = {Ai}, where Ai is the action
space of node i ∈ I ; T = {Ti}, where Ti is the type space of
node i; P = {pi}, where pi is a belief of other players’ type
based on the type of node i; U = {ui}, where ui is the payoﬀ
function for node i.
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Table 2: Payoﬀ table of recommendation game.
Reputation provider
Truth No comment Lie
Reputation
Requester
Trust S, t 0, 0 S,−l
Distrust −S, t 0, 0 −S,−l
According to the definition, recommendation game has
the following properties.
Property 1. Recommendation game is an n-player game,
where n ≥ 2.
In the node set I , there are only one reputation requester
and at least one provider. If there is no reputation provider,
then this game cannot be played.
Property 2. Recommendation game is an incomplete infor-
mation game.
Firstly, a requester contained in an RG does not know if
a provider is lying. Secondary, requester does not know the
relationship between a given provider and the target, while
providers know whether the target is their confederate or
not. At last, reputation provider does not know whether the
requester would trust it or not, and it also does not know how
the requester evaluates a recommendation.
Definition 3. Let Ar and Aip be action spaces of reputation
requester and reputation provider, respectively, then the
action spaces are defined by
Ar = {Trust,Distrust},
Aip = {Lie, Truth,No-Comment}, i ∈ I.
(7)
Definition 4. Let Tr and Tp be type spaces of reputation
requester and reputation provider, respectively. Given a pair
of independent constant parameters TCr and TCp, where
TCr ,TCp ∈ (0, +∞), we can define their type spaces as
follows:





Definition 5. Let pr and pp be belief of reputation requester







, pp(tr) = 1TCr , (9)
where tr and tp are private information of reputation
requester and reputation provider, respectively, and tr ∈
Tr , tp ∈ Tp. Both of them are random variables and follow
uniform distribution in their type spaces.
4.4.2. Strategy and Payoﬀ. The strategy of reputation
requester and provider can be shown in Table 2.
If reputation provider gives a fair recommendation, no
matter the requester believes or not, it could gain positive
payoﬀ, namely t. However, if it cheats the requester, then
it would be denoted as malicious node. And then, such
provider would lose others’ trust in the later transactions.
According to the requester’s strategy, “Tit for Tat”, it would
gain a negative reputation, namely −l. t, and l, both are
positive parameters and t is less than l commonly. It means
that it is more diﬃcult to build reputation and easier to
destroy it.
On the other hand, if the requester trusts a lie, then the
related attacksmaybe come true. Consequently, the requester
would gain negative payoﬀ about data transmitting. On the
contrary, it might obtain a positive payoﬀ for distrusting a
lie.
Theory 1. Recommendation requester does not have the
absolute best strategy.
The strategy of recommendation requester depends on
the evaluation of private information about recommenda-
tion provider, hence, it does not have the absolute best
strategy. In other words, recommendation requester has the
risk of the final strategy for ever.
Theory 2. The recommendation provider conditional makes
“TRUTH” as it is the absolute best strategy, and the condition
is defined as
TCp < (t + l). (10)
Equation (10) is the design reference about parameters
of RG. We can choose appropriate t and l according to
the detail application scenario, to make recommendation
provider has only one strategy, TRUTH, and then, unfair
positive recommendation should be reduced sharply.
4.5. Reputation in Route Discovery. Routing protocol in the
COSR is based on DSR, hence, route discovery of COSR
contains two mechanisms which are shown in Figure 2.
4.5.1. RREQ and RREP. RREQ and RREP are basic methods
to discover route paths, however, they only can obtain limited
route paths which are shown as white blocks in Figure 2(b).
In this procedure, malicious nodes may launch attack in
two cases: broadcasting wrong RREQ and transmitting false
RREP. The possible attacks include DoS, Blackhole, and
selfish. Due to this problem, COSR uses reputation against
such attacks. When a node received an RREQ or RREP
packet, it should check the sender’s reputation, firstly. If
sender’s reputation does not refer enough to reputation
threshold, such node would not believe route information
contained in received packet and would abort it without any
notification.
4.5.2. Path Collection. Path collection is an extended mech-
anism to discover more route paths in only one procedure
of RREQ and RREP. Path collection includes two directions:
forwarding and reversing. Firstly, forwarding direction only
allows source node and intermediate nodes collect route
paths along the direction to destination contained in RREP.
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Table 3: Simulator parameters
Dimensions of Space 1000m × 1000m
Total Number of Nodes 40
Node Placement Uniform
Mobility Random Waypoint Model
Move Speed 0∼20m/s
Mobile Pause Time 0s
Max Transmission Range 250m
MAC 802.11
Link Bandwidth 2Mbps
Application 30 CBR Connections,
64 B/packet, 1 packet/s
Simulation Time 900 s
Payoﬀ Parameters of RG α = 0.3, β = 1.0
It is shown as lightgreen blocks in Figure 2(b). Secondary,
reverse direction permits all nodes related to this route
discovery to collect reverse route paths to upriver nodes.
It is shown as lightcyan blocks in Figure 2(a). Obviously,
path collection could accelerate route discovering. However,
it still has to face a serial of malicious attacks, such as
DoS, Blackhole, and selfish, because relative packets and
route information were not certificated. Similarly, COSR uses
reputation of packets’ sender to verify whether to believe or
not.
5. Evaluation of COSR
5.1. Environment. The evaluation of COSR is performed
upon the GloMoSim, a simulator for wireless network. In the
GloMoSim, we configure a mobile Ad Hoc network with a
number of connections. Each experiment was repeated FIVE
times with diﬀerent seed which is a parameter configured
in the GloMoSim and aﬀects placement and movement of
nodes. The main parameters of environment are listed in
Table 3.
5.2. Scenario. The evaluation would be done at following
scenarios.
(i) Blackhole: This attack includes active Blackhole
(ABH) and passive Blackhole (PBH). Attackers would
drop all data packets which need forwarding. Black-
hole attackers would never initiate a CBR connection.
Active Blackhole attacker will actively sniﬀ neighbors’
RREQ and inject RREP with false route path. Passive
Blackhole attackers guise normal nodes in the route
discovery, but they pose blackhole in the data trans-
mission.
(ii) Selfish: Selfish nodes discard data packets selectively
according to preconfigured probability.
(iii) DoS: Attackers would inject various protocol mes-
sages with wrong and long route, including RREQ,
and RREP. Once attack is running, attacker would not
participate in any application.
Table 4: The comparison of ratio of packet received
Attacks
ABH PBH Selfish DoS
Protocols
COSR 79% 76% 82% 69%
DSR 34% 42% 76% 61%
CONFIDENT without
Configured Friends
40% 52% 77% 45%
CONFIDENT with
Configured Friends
76% 80% 85% 77%
5.3. Performance Metrics
(i) Average Path Length (APL):This is defined as the aver-
age hop number of delivered data packets between
sources and destinations. It denotes end-to-end delay.
(ii) Percentage of Packet Received (PPR): This is defined as
the ratio of the number of data packets received by
the destinations to all sent by the source nodes. PPR
not only shows the throughput of routing protocol,
but also reflects the security and reliability of it.
(iii) Normalized Protocol Load (NPL): This is defined
as the ratio of the number of originated control
messages to the number of delivered data packets.
NPL describes the eﬃciency of routing protocol.
5.4. Results and Discussing
5.4.1. Varying Proportion of Blackhole and Selfish Nodes.
Figure 3 shows the capability of COSR against Blackhole and
selfish attack. According to the result, COSR improves the
PPR largely contrasts with DSR on both active Blackhole and
passive Blackhole. Due to lack of any security mechanism,
DSR’s PPR drops down sharply and only 20% of data packets
are delivered successfully at the worst situation. On the
Contrary, COSR can maintain PPR to be about 50% even
90% of nodes are malicious. The result of selfish attack is
similar to Blackhole.
5.4.2. Varying Proportion of DoS Nodes. Figure 4 shows the
capability of COSR against DoS attack. The result shows that
DSR’s PPR decreases sharply with the growing of the ratio of
rushing attacker. Due to injecting a large number of wrong
route information byDoS attacker,mostly nodes’ route cache
within DSR would overflow rapidly. At the worst situation,
less than 10% of data packets can be delivered successfully.
However, COSR plays better and its PPR is much smoother
than DSR’s.
5.4.3. Varying Proportion of Liars. As recommendation is the
main element of reputation, false recommendation produced
by liars may destroy reputation system. Figure 5 verifies the
capability of COSR against lies. This experiment is to be done
at the situations in which the network contains 5% active
Blackhole attackers. Further, all liars are selfish. The result
shows how many data packets are delivered when there are
liars in the MANET for two scenarios: COSR without RG
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Figure 2: Route discovery and path collection in COSR.























Figure 3: COSR against blackhole and selfish.
and COSR with RG. By contrasting Figure 5 with Figures 3
and 4, it can be found that lies could influence the eﬀect of
reputation model of COSR, but when RG begins work, its
PPR is improved obviously.
5.4.4. Performance. These experiments are done at the
environment, that there are 30% of nodes are malicious, and


























Figure 4: COSR against DoS.
In the Figure 6, with the growing of pause time, NPL
is decreased continually, because longer pause time makes
topology of network stabler. By contrasting COSR with DSR,
NPL of COSR is larger than that of DSR, especially when
pause time is small. On the contrary, their NPLs are close
when topology of network is changing slowly. Figure 7 shows
the NPL of COSR and DSR with the growing of maximum
velocity. It is the same as Figure 6, NPL of COSR is larger
than that of DSR when topology of network is changing fast.

























Figure 5: COSR against Liars.




























Figure 6: NPL of COSR and DSR with various pause time.
Figures 8 and 9 show the throughput of COSR and DSR
with such scenarios. According to the results, COSR gains
higher throughput than DSR, even topology of network is
changing fast. As active Blackhole attacker performs more
active malicious behavior so that COSR could detect it easier
than passive Blackhole, though active Blackhole is more
aggressive than passive Blackhole in DSR.
Figures 10 and 11 give the end-to-end delay of data
packets. With various pause time, APL of COSR is less than
that of DSR greatly. However, their APLs are closed with
various maximum velocity. This shows that pause time is
more important on aﬀecting network topology than mobile
velocity. With growing pause time, the diﬀerence becomes
significant because fixed network topology ismore conducive
to COSR detecting malicious nodes.


























Figure 7: NPL of COSR and DSR with various maximum velocity.























Figure 8: Throughput of COSR and DSR with various pause time.
5.4.5. Comparison. Moreover, we do a comparison simu-
lation among COSR, DSR, and CONFIDENT within the
scenario which is described by Table 3 and contained 30%
malicious nodes. According to CONFIDENT, we provide
two sets of simulation result. In the first set, CONFIDENT
does not contain preconfigured friends list. In the other set,
we configure several default friends in each node’s Trust
Manager before simulation according to CONFIDENT’s
design. In this comparison simulation, we mainy compare
the ratio of packet received when the routing protocol is
against active Blackhole, passive Blackhole, Selfish, and DoS.
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Figure 9: Throughput of COSR and DSR with various maximum
velocity.





















Figure 10: APL of COSR and DSR with various pause time.
According to the simulation result shown in Table 4, we
can find that CONFIDENT gains the highest performance
when it contains preconfigured friends. However, CONFI-
DENT’s performance decreases sharply when we canceled
the preconfigured friends. At this situation, CONFIDENT is
similar to DSR, on the contrary, COSR acquires satisfactory
performance. The reason is that COSR designed a dynamical
mechanism to construct friendship between strange nodes in
the SON, but CONFIDENT does not provide such scheme.
Therefore, COSR is more suitable for the dynamical SON
in which there are a lot of nodes joining and leaving
continuously.





















Figure 11: APL of COSR and DSR with various maximum velocity.
6. Conclusion
By using dynamic source routing protocol, communication
among self-organized wireless network comes true. However,
the existing malicious nodes destroyed the traditional rout-
ing protocol, such as DSR, and AODV. To mitigate the eﬀect
of malicious behavior, we present a reputation-based secure
routing protocol, called COSR, for MANET. The COSR uses
a novel reputation model to detect malicious and selfish
nodes and make all nodes more cooperative. Further, repu-
tation is not only used to evaluate the trustworthiness of any
node, but also to describe its CoF. Due to such design, COSR
can protect network against the primary routing attacks and
balance load on all secure route paths to avoid hotpoint and
enlarge throughput of whole network consequently. Under
most simulation scenarios, COSR improves PPR, and APL
largely refers to DSR, though NPL of COSR is more than
that of DSR. Therefore, the ongoing research of COSR is
improving is eﬃciency of COSR.We hope to decrease its NPL
with current PPR and APL levels.
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